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Emerging market ¯nancial crises are abrupt and dramatic, usually occurring after a
period of high output growth, massive capital °ows, and a boom in asset markets. This
paper develops an equilibrium asset pricing model with informational frictions in which
vulnerability and the crisis itself are consequences of the investor optimism in the period
preceding the crisis. The model features two sets of investors, domestic and foreign. Both
sets of investors are imperfectly informed about the true state of the emerging economy.
Investors learn from noisy signals which contain information relevant for asset returns and
formulate expectations, or \beliefs", about the state of productivity. Numerical analysis
shows that, if preceded by a sequence of positive signals, a small, negative noise shock can
trigger a sharp downward adjustment in investors' beliefs, asset prices, and consumption.
The magnitude of this downward adjustment and sensitivity to negative signals increase
with the level of optimism attained prior to the negative signal. Moreover, with the in-
troduction of informational frictions, asset prices display persistent e®ects in response to
transitory shocks, and the volatility of consumption increases.
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...That this region [East Asia] might become embroiled in one of the worst ¯nancial
crises in the postwar period was hardly ever considered-within or outside the region-a
realistic possibility. What went wrong? Part of the answer seems to be that these
countries became victims of their own success. This success had led domestic and
foreign investors to underestimate the countries economic weaknesses. It had also,
partly because of the large scale ¯nancial in°ows that it encouraged, increased the
demands on policies and institutions, especially but not only in the ¯nancial sector;
and policies and institutions had not kept pace. The fundamental policy shortcomings
and their rami¯cations were fully revealed only as the crisis deepened... IMF (1998)
The experience of the last decade suggests that emerging capital markets are vulnerable to
signi¯cant shifts in investors' con¯dence in both upward and downward directions. Downward
shifts in con¯dence and ¯nancial market collapses are abrupt and often take place unexpectedly
after a large boom. Table 1 documents the magnitude of these booms for several pre-crisis
episodes: Argentina and Mexico in 1994, Korea in 1997, and Turkey in 2000. Taking Turkey as
an example, the year before its ¯nancial crisis in 2001, the country boasted an average quarterly
current account-to-GDP ratio of -5.1%, consumption growth of 4.5%, an increase in equity prices
of 57% and GDP growth of 3%.1
It is widely agreed that overcon¯dence and informational problems are at least partially
responsible for recent crisis episodes, as the above opening quote by International Monetary
Fund on the Asian crisis suggests. Whether these frictions in international capital markets can
be large enough to explain pre-crisis periods of bonanza and the depth of the crises remains an
open question.
In this paper, we aim to answer this question by studying the quantitative predictions of
a model in which optimism, due to investors' underestimation of the weaknesses of emerging
economies, acts as the driving force behind both the pre-crisis booms and the vulnerability that
paves the way to ¯nancial turmoil and deep recessions. In the model, the pre-crisis bonanza
is driven by a sequence of positive signals that investors interpret as an improvement in the
true fundamentals of the economy. The crisis occurs as a sudden downward adjustment in
investors' expectations of the true fundamentals is triggered and their optimism suddenly fades.
1Calvo and Reinhart (2000) conclude that \Sudden Stops," sharp negative reversals of capital °ows, are
usually preceded by a surge in capital in°ows.
1Furthermore, the magnitude of the adjustment increases with the level of optimism attained
prior to the crisis.
Table 1: Magnitudes of pre-crisis booms2
Episode GDP (%) Private Consumption (%) Equity Price (%) CA/GDP (%)
Argentina, 1994Q1-Q4 1.72 2.67 12.97 -1.08
Mexico, 1994Q1-Q4 3.43 6.69 18.53 -2.00
Korea, 1996Q4-1997Q3 3.67 5.14 1.04 -3.69
Turkey, 2000Q1-Q4 3.08 4.51 57.30 -5.12
The informational frictions that are the key ingredient of the model, are likely to be prevalent
in emerging markets for several reasons. One is the lack of transparency in policy-making, and
data reporting which manifests itself in the form of inaccurate or misleading data. In a report,
the International Monetary Fund argued that this was a common thread running through several
recent crisis episodes:
... A lack of transparency was a feature of the build-up to the Mexican crisis of
1994-95 and of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. In these crises, markets were
kept in the dark about important developments and became ¯rst uncertain and then
unnerved as a host of interrelated problems came to light. Inadequate economic
data, hidden weaknesses in ¯nancial systems, and a lack of clarity about government
policies and policy formulation contributed to a loss of con¯dence that ultimately
threatened to undermine global stability ...(2001)
A second reason informational frictions pose particular challenges for emerging economies
is the existence of high ¯xed costs associated with obtaining country-speci¯c information and
keeping up with the developments in emerging economies, as suggested by Calvo (1999). Such
costs could arise due to idiosyncrasies a®ecting ¯nancial markets in these countries, including
for example, each country's unique institutions, policies, political environment, legal structure,
etc. In addition, it might be optimal for international investors not to \buy" this information.
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) provide two arguments for why this can be the case. First, if short
2Average quarterly changes in GDP, private consumption, equity prices and average quarterly current account-
to-GDP ratios. GDP, and consumption are in constant prices, equity prices are in local currencies and are de°ated
using the CPI. Source: International Financial Statistics and corresponding countries' central banks.
2selling positions are limited, the bene¯t of paying for costly information declines as the number
of emerging economies in which to invest becomes su±ciently large. Second, if punishment
for poor performance is high, managers of investment funds may choose to mimic each other's
behavior instead of paying for costly information.
The model in this paper features two types of investors, domestic and foreign, both of whom
trade a single emerging market asset. Domestic investors are consumer-investors who maximize
the expected present discounted value of their lifetime utility. Foreign investors specialize in
trading the emerging market asset, face trading costs, and maximize the expected present dis-
counted value of pro¯ts from investing. We model the informational frictions as follows. Both
sets of investors are imperfectly informed about the true state of current productivity, which
contains information relevant for predicting future returns on the emerging market asset. They
can only partially infer the true state of productivity by \learning" from publicly observed divi-
dends (or signals) and, they share the same information set. The dividends consist of two parts:
a persistent component, which we interpret as \true productivity", and a transitory component,
which is a noise term that controls the accuracy of the signals. Modeled in this way, dividends
serve an informational role since a dividend payment is a noisy signal that contains information
about current and future realizations of productivity. Every period, foreign and domestic in-
vestors observe dividends, solve a signal extraction problem, and \learn" about productivity by
updating their expectations or \beliefs" regarding true productivity.
When investors turn pessimistic (optimistic), asset prices are driven below (above) the \fun-
damentals price," which is de¯ned as the expected present discounted value of dividends con-
ditional on full information. In these periods, asset prices and domestic investors' consumption
display swings that are not associated with changes in true productivity. We ¯nd that a se-
quence of positive signals can cause a boom in both the asset market and in consumption, and
can be a source of economic vulnerability if true productivity is in fact low. If a negative signal
is realized at the peak of a boom of this nature and, as a result, \challenges" current prevailing
beliefs, an abrupt and large downward adjustment in asset prices and consumption takes place.
If, however, the same signal \con¯rms" prevailing beliefs, its impact is smaller.3
Foreign and domestic investors trade due to di®erences in their objective functions particu-
larly their risk aversions, but not for speculation (given that they have the same beliefs). From
3Moore and Schaller (2002) establish the state dependence of responses to noisy signals. We borrow our
terminology from them.
3the domestic investors' perspective, dividend shocks are important for two reasons. First, in or-
der to intertemporally smooth consumption domestic investors would like to increase (decrease)
their asset position in response to positive (negative) dividend shocks. Second, they play a crit-
ical informational role. In response to a negative dividend shock, changes in expectations due
to the new information compounds the ¯rst e®ect, and as result, domestic investors reduce their
demand for the emerging market asset. Foreign investors also reduce their demand for the asset
in response to this shock, since they receive a negative signal regarding future productivity. In
equilibrium, we ¯nd that domestic investors' demand decreases by more than that of their foreign
counterparts, therefore, domestic investors become net sellers in response to a negative dividend
shock. This result leads to a procyclical current account on average. However, we also ¯nd
that for a given dividend shock, the higher the expectations about future productivity, the lower
are the domestic investors' asset holdings since higher expectations induce foreign investors to
bid more aggressively, compared to their risk-averse domestic counterparts, for the same asset.
Hence, the higher the investment optimism, the more the emerging economy can attract foreign
investment, and therefore the more likely the country is to develop a potentially sizable current
account de¯cit. For a given dividend shock, the model can thus produce a current account de¯cit
and booms in consumption and asset prices if investors are \su±ciently optimistic".
The numerical analysis shows that with the introduction of informational frictions, the volatil-
ity of the emerging economy's consumption increases by 2 percentage points compared to the
\full information" setup. Uncertainty about true current productivity leads to increased uncer-
tainty regarding future asset returns and a more volatile consumption pro¯le for the risk averse
domestic investors. Moreover, informational frictions produce persistence in response to transi-
tory noise shocks. If investors turn pessimistic (optimistic) in response to a misleading signal,
it takes several periods for them to correct their beliefs. The mechanism behind this result is
the Bayesian learning process: the posteriors of one period are used in the calculation of the
following period's priors.
This paper is at the crossroads of two main strands of literature. The ¯rst is the literature
on Sudden Stops and ¯nancial crises in open economies, and the second is that on informational
frictions in ¯nance. Most existing models of ¯nancial crises and Sudden Stops, focus on crash
episodes, but not on the booms preceding the crashes that might indeed contain the seeds of
the ¯nancial crises. In contrast, the model proposed in this paper accounts for the boom-bust
cycles observed in emerging markets. Studies explaining Sudden Stops focus on ¯nancial frictions
4and often utilize collateral constraints, (see, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001),
Paasche (2001), or Mendoza and Smith (2004)). Credit constraints are successful for producing
ampli¯cation in the response of the economy to typical negative shocks. In this paper, however,
business cycles can also be driven by changes in investor sentiment and ampli¯cation is at work
in expansions as well as in recessions.
In the international ¯nance literature, shifts in investor sentiment have usually been analyzed
within the context of currency crises, often using sunspot models that produce multiple equilibria.
In this paper, we take a di®erent approach by considering a model with a unique equilibrium
that can endogenously produce shifts in investors' con¯dence and switches between good states
and bad ones which allows us to predict when these shifts occur and how long it takes for the
market to recover after a bust.
This paper is also related to the literature on learning in macro and ¯nance. Particularly,
Wang (1994), models dividends as noisy signals to analyze trading volume in stock markets,
Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2004) use noisy dividend signals to investigate the e®ects
of investor sophistication on international equity °ows, and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2004)
use them to explain U.S. business cycle asymmetries in an RBC framework with asymmetric
learning.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe the model in Section 2, and in Section
3 we discuss the model's solution procedure, calibration, and numerical results. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
2 Model
The economy has two classes of agents, foreign investors and domestic household-investors, who
are identical within each class. The domestic households maximize expected lifetime utility
by making consumption and asset holding decisions conditional on their information set, that
includes the noisy signals about the true state of productivity. Foreign investors choose their asset
positions in order to maximize the expected present discounted value of pro¯ts based on their
beliefs about the state of productivity. Foreign investors also face trading costs associated with
operating in the asset market. Neither domestic nor foreign investors observe the true realization
of the stochastic productivity shock, which contains information relevant for forecasting the
returns from the asset. They only observe dividends, which are noisy signals about the true
5value of productivity. Foreign and domestic investors form their beliefs by solving a signal
extraction problem.
2.1 Domestic Households' Problem
Domestic households choose stochastic intertemporal plans for consumption, ct, and asset hold-

















ct + ®t+1qt = ®t(qt + dt) (2)
taking asset prices, qt, and the evolution of beliefs and their information set IU as given.4 dt
denotes dividend payments of the emerging market asset, the parameter ¾ is the coe±cient of
relative risk aversion of domestic investors and ¯ is the standard subjective discount factor.
At the beginning of each period, productivity shocks are realized and dividends are de-
termined. Domestic investors make their decisions after observing dividends. The optimality
conditions characterizing their decisions are:
¯
tu
0(ct) ¡ ¸t = 0 (3)
¡¸tqt + Et[¸t+1(dt+1 + qt+1)jI
U
t ] = 0 (4)
where ¸t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Combining










This equation is familiar except that the expectations are taken conditional on the information
set IU
t .
4We discuss the role of the expectation operator and the information structure in Section 2.3.
62.2 Foreign Investors' Problem
As in Mendoza and Smith (2004), foreign investors choose f®¤
t+1g1
0 in order to maximize the





























t + µ)2 is the total trading cost associated with buying and selling equities in the
emerging economies, µ is the recurrent cost. As in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and
Smith (2004), we model the trading cost associated with buying and selling the asset as quadratic





































t, called the belief price, is de¯ned as the expected present discounted value of future dividends









Intuitively, foreign investors adjust their asset holdings \partially" depending on the gap between
the market price qt and their belief price qb
t. How much of this gap is re°ected in the asset demand
is determined by 1=a.
5This speci¯cation does not rule out buy & hold type of trading strategies. The foreign investors are allowed
to buy and \watch" the market and sell when they ¯nd it pro¯table to so. The assumption that µ 6= 0 implies
that \watching" the market also comes at a cost although it is less costly compared to trading. It is intuitive to
assume that \watching" the market is costly as the investors still need to follow the developments in the emerging
economy so as to determine the right time to sell. In Section 3.4, we do analyze the robustness of out results to
this assumption by solving the case in which µ = 0.
72.3 Information Structure
Dividends are determined exogenously as follows:
dt = e
zt+´t: (10)
There are two types of uncertainty associated with dividends: persistent aggregate productivity
shocks, z, and noise, in the form of transitory, additive, Normal i.i.d. shocks, ´, with E[´] =
¡¾2
´=2 and E[´2] = ¾2
´: ´ » N(¡¾2
´=2;¾2
´).6 Aggregate productivity shocks follow a Markov
process with two states and transition probability matrix P. We denote the values z can take
as z 2 fzL;zHg and assume zL < zH without loss of generality.
Assumption P >> 0 (irreducible Markov chain) and Pii 6= Pji where Pij is the probability of
transiting from state i to state j, i;j 2 fL;Hg and i 6= j (positive autocorrelation).
P >> 0 rules out absorbent states. Pii = Pji would imply that the probability of transiting
to state i is the same regardless of the current state. Therefore, in this case, information
regarding the current state would not be useful for forecasting the following period's state (no
autocorrelation).
We assume both sets of investors know the true distributions governing the productivity
shocks z and the noise ´. They observe the dividends d at the beginning of each period, but do
not observe the current or past values of the productivity shock z or the noise ´.7 Both investors
use the information revealed by dividends in order to infer the realization of the productivity
shock in the current period.8 Beliefs are de¯ned as:




t includes the entire history of dividends observed by the investors:
I
U
t ´ fdt;dt¡1;:::g: (12)
6This speci¯cation for E[´] guarantees that changes in ¾´ produce mean preserving spreads.
7One can imagine that investors observe productivity with such a long lag that, once received, the information
is no longer useful for predicting current productivity any more.
8It is also possible to model di®erent types of publicly observed signals, such as news reports, in addition
to dividends. In any case, the model variables will be sensitive to the information content of the signals and
this sensitivity will be qualitatively similar but quantitatively di®erent depending on the informativeness of the
publicly observed signals.
8Throughout the paper we refer to this information structure as the \incomplete information"
scenario. The belief e zt is formed by updating the previous period's belief e zt¡1 using Bayes' rule,





f(dtjzt = zi)Pr(zt = zijIU
t¡1)
f(dtjzt = zj)Pr(zt = zjjIU
t¡1) + f(dtjzt = zi)Pr(zt = zijIU
t¡1)
(13)












for i;j 2 fH;Lg and i 6= j. Equation (13) is used to update the probability assigned to being
in the high productivity state, incorporating the additional information revealed by dt at the
beginning of period t. The priors that will be used in period t + 1 for updating beliefs are
obtained by simply adjusting for the probability of a change in state from period t to t+1 using




t ) = Pr(zt = z
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Once the posteriors of the current period are calculated, beliefs are:









Proposition 1 0 < Pr(zt = zijIU
t¡1) < 1 and 0 < Pr(zt = zijIU
t ) < 1.
Proof See Appendix.
The interval to be considered for the prior and posterior probabilities is (0;1). The prior
Pr(z0 = zijIU
¡1) or the posterior Pr(z0 = zijIU
0 ) can be set exogenously to \start" from 0 or 1.
Afterwards, however, it can take these values with zero probability. From Equation (16), we
know that beliefs are convex combinations of low and high values of productivity, with weights
de¯ned by the Bayesian posterior probabilities assigned to each state. Hence, beliefs are always
higher than the low value of productivity and lower than the high value, zL < e z < zH. This
implies that agents can never be exactly sure about being in a particular state. In addition,
they never underestimate (overestimate) productivity to be lower (higher) than the low (high)
realization of the true productivity. This is an unappealing feature of learning with discrete
9probabilistic processes. Also, as a result of this limitation, the standard deviation of beliefs is
always less than or equal to that of productivity.
Equation (16) implies that beliefs are su±cient to backtrack the probabilities assigned to
each state. Using Equation (16) and Pr(zt = zijIU
t ) = 1 ¡ Pr(zt = zjjIU
t ) for i;j 2 fH;Lg
and i 6= j, a given e zt can be mapped to a unique Pr(zt = zijIU
t ). The assumption that
provides this simpli¯cation is having two states for productivity. This simpli¯cation is crucial
for the numerical analysis since probabilities assigned to each state are continuous endogenous
state variables for the problem. Given the computational di±culty of handling continuous state
variables, we assume two states for productivity and carry e z as a state variable that is su±cient
for backtracking the posterior probabilities assigned to each state of productivity.
















Figure 1: Density of dt conditional on zt.
We denote the evolution of investors' beliefs as e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1). When investors make their
decisions at date t, dt+1 is not known, but its distribution conditional on zt+1 is known to both
domestic and foreign investors. Figure 1 plots these conditional distributions for signal-to-noise
ratios of 1.66 and 2.26, respectively.9 As the signal-to-noise ratio increases, the distribution of
dividends conditional on the high and low productivity overlap less, as a result, dividends become
more informative. In Figure 1, most of the conditional density is concentrated around the means
when the signal-to-noise ratio is high (right panel). As ¾´ decreases (or as the signal-to-noise
ratio increases), these two conditional densities separate, and in the limit as ¾´ approaches zero,
the informational imperfection vanishes.
9The signal-to-noise ratio is de¯ned as z
H¡z
L
¾´ . We pick these particular values for the signal-to-noise ratios
because they are also the ones used for the numerical analysis.
10In Figure 2, we plot e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1) for three di®erent values of e zt where dt+1 is on the hori-
zontal axis and e zt+1 is on the vertical axis. The solid curve corresponds to e zt+1 = Á(min(e z);dt+1);
that is, it is the case where the investors are \almost sure" that the economy is in the bad state
today. Similarly, the dashed curve shows e zt+1 = Á(max(e z);dt+1), or the case in which they
are optimistic. All other beliefs would be represented by curves that lie between the solid and
dashed curves, such as the dotted curve, which shows the case in which the investors assign
equal probability to each state, e zt+1 = Á(zH+zL
2 ;dt+1).















Figure 2: Next period's beliefs e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1) for three di®erent values of current beliefs e zt.
Proposition 2 If Pii < Pji then Á(e zt;dt+1) is strictly increasing in both of its arguments.
Proof See Appendix.
Pii > Pji corresponds to a scenario where knowing the current state would still be useful for
forecasting future productivity: the information that the economy is in a particular state would
reveal that the economy is more likely to transition to the other state than to stay in the same
state in the subsequent period (negative autocorrelation). Although information is valuable and
learning would still take place, we rule out the case Pii > Pji in order to establish Proposition 2.
The elasticity of e zt+1 with respect to dt+1 varies depending on e zt. When the investors assign
a high probability to being in the low state (e zt is low), a low realization of dt+1 \con¯rms"
the beliefs and as a result e zt+1 changes only marginally. On the other hand, if a high dt+1 is
11observed, the beliefs of investors are \challenged" and there is a large adjustment in the next
period's beliefs.
In order to see this, consider the following scenario. Assume that true productivity is low
and that investors' current beliefs are \almost correct". In this case, e zt = mine z, as depicted by
\lowest beliefs" curve in Figure 2. The vertical line in Figure 2 marks the mean of the signals
conditional on the economy being in the low state. Hence, a small negative noise shock is a
realization of dividends to the left of this vertical line. If investors observe a negative noisy
signal at t + 1, the response of beliefs to this signal is minimal (the solid curve is °at on the
left side of the vertical line). On the other hand, if investors receive a sequence of misleading
positive signals before the negative one, their optimism builds up and their beliefs can move to
reach that re°ected in dashed curve in Figure 2. When the economy ends up in this situation,
the response to a small negative signal is large (the dashed curve is steep on the left side of the
vertical line). Therefore, a stream of positive signals can move the economy to a vulnerable state
in which a negative signal triggers a large downward adjustment. As investors turn optimistic,
it is as if the economy is moving along the convex part of this curve. The point of maximum
vulnerability lies at the intersection of the vertical line and the in°ection point of the curve.
Figure 3 shows the numerical derivative of Á(e zt;dt+1) with respect to dt+1 around dt+1 = zL
as a function of e zt.10 This derivative captures the response of the beliefs to a small, negative
signal conditional on true productivity being low, and it approximates the \vulnerability" of the
economy. Figure 3 illustrates that this derivative is a convex function. Hence, the response of
beliefs to a negative signal increases at an increasing rate with the level of optimism attained
prior to the negative signal. The convexity of the derivative of Á(:) is due to the assumption
that true productivity is a discrete random variable. In the case of continuous random variables,
learning takes place in a linear fashion, that is, the posteriors are a convex combination of the
priors and the signal with weights that depend on the signal-to-noise ratio. In that case, this
derivative would be linearly increasing in the level of optimism prior to the negative signal.
The quantitative analysis focuses on the model's equilibrium which is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition A competitive equilibrium is given by allocations ®0(®;e z;d), c(®;e z;d), ®¤0(®;e z;d)
and asset prices q(®;e z;d) such that:
(i) Domestic households maximize U subject to their budget constraint and their information




" for " small and positive. In the ¯gure, we
plot this expression for di®erent values of e z.
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∂φ(e zt,dt+1)
∂dt+1
Figure 3: The derivative of Á(e zt;dt+1) with respect to dt+1 as a function of e zt.
set, IU, taking asset prices as given.
(ii) Foreign investors maximize the expected present discounted value of future pro¯ts condi-
tional on their beliefs about the state of productivity, taking asset prices as given.
(iii) The goods and asset markets clear.
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Computation
The dynamic programming representation of the domestic investors' problem for i;j 2 fL;Hg
and i 6= j is:
V (®;e z;d) = max



































The solution algorithm includes the following steps:
1. Discretize the state space. We use 102 equally spaced nodes for ® and 40 equally spaced nodes
for e z in the intervals [:83;1:00] and [zL;zH] respectively. To discretize the noise component of
dividends we use Gaussian quadratures with 20 quadrature nodes.
2. Evaluate the evolution of beliefs e zt+1 = Á(e zt;dt+1) using Equations (13)-(16).
133. For a conjectured pricing function qold(®;e z;d), solve the dynamic programming problem
described in Equation 17 using value function iterations in order to get ®0(®;e z;d) and c(®;e z;d).
4. Calculate the foreign investors' demand function using domestic investors' asset demand
function obtained in Step 3 and the market clearing condition in the asset market, ®¤ + ® = 1.
5. Using foreign investors' demand calculated in Equation (8), calculate new prices qnew(®;e z;d).
6. Update the conjectured prices with »qold(®;e z;d) + (1 ¡ »)qnew(®;e z;d) where » is a ¯xed
relaxation parameter that satis¯es » 2 (0;1) and is set close to 1 in order to dampen hog cycles.
7. Iterate prices until convergence according to the stopping criterion maxfjqnew ¡ qoldjg <
0:00001 and get equilibrium asset prices q(®;e z;d).
To check the accuracy of the solution of the dynamic programming problem, we evaluate
Euler equation residuals as described in Judd (1992). In order to do so, we solve for ^ c in the
following Euler equation:
qtu
0(^ ct) = ¯Et[(qt+1 + dt+1)u
0(ct+1)]: (18)
Intuitively, we evaluate the consumption function that exactly satis¯es the Euler equation im-
plied by the solution of the dynamic programming problem. Then, we calculate 1 ¡ (^ ct=ct),
which is a unitless measure of error. We ¯nd that the average Euler equation error is 0:0016.11
Euler equation errors do not include the errors from the price iteration since the Euler
equation must hold for any pricing function, not only the equilibrium pricing function. As a
measure for the accuracy of the equilibrium price, we report the tolerance of the price iteration.
Tolerance is de¯ned as the maximum of the absolute value of the di®erence between prices
evaluated in the last two consecutive iterations, maxfjqnew ¡ qoldjg. We iterate prices until
tolerance is less than 0.00001.
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated quarterly for Turkey using data for the 1987:1-2005:2 period. We set
the risk free interest rate to average US Treasury Bill rate, R = (1:0471):25 = 1:0115. We
set ¯ = 0:9886 and ¾ = 2 following the business cycles literature. We set the trading costs
of the foreign investors to fa = 0:001;µ = 0:1g. With this calibration, total trading costs on
average constitute 0.2589% of foreign investors' per period pro¯ts as speci¯ed in Equation (6)
and 1.8845% of the trade value. These costs are in line with the ¯ndings of Domowitz, Glen
11Judd (1992) calls this measure the \bounded rationality measure," and interprets an error of 0:0016 as a $16
error made on a $10000 expenditure.
14and Madhavan (2001) showing equity trading costs during the period 1996-1998 for a total of
42 countries among which 20 are emerging countries. They found that for emerging markets,
trading costs are higher than the developed ones and they range between 0.58% (Brazil) and
1.97% (Korea) as percentage of trade value.
We estimate the parameters f¾´;zH;zLg and Markov transition probabilities fPHH;PLLg
using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure similar to the one described in Hamilton
(1989). For this exercise, we use quarterly GDP data for Turkey from 1987:1 to 2005:2 with
a total of 74 observations. The data are from Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey's web
site and are in constant 1987 prices. They are logged, seasonally adjusted (using the Bureau of
Economic Analysis's X12 Method) and ¯ltered with HP ¯lter using a smoothing parameter of
1600.
Table 2: Model parameters
¯ 0.9881 Discount factor
R 1.0121 Risk free rate
¾ 2 Risk aversion coe±cient
PHH 0.8933 Transition probability from H to H
PLL 0.6815 Transition probability from L to L
zL -0.0427 Productivity in state L
zH +0.0175 Productivity in state H
¾´ 0.0362 Standard deviation of noise
zH¡zL
¾´ 1.6638 Signal-to-noise ratio
fa;µg f0:001;0:1g Trading costs
We denote the observed GDP series as yt for t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg and the parameters to be
estimated are Ã ´ fzi;zj;¾´;Pii;Pjjg. The algorithm used for the estimation is as follows:
1. Calculate the ergodic distribution of the Markov process, ¼ = [¼i ¼j], using ¼i = (1 ¡
Pjj)=(2 ¡ Pjj ¡ Pii). ¼j can be calculated using ¼i + ¼j = 1.




















15where Pr(zt = zijyt¡1) denotes the posterior probability assigned to being in state i conditional
on the observed history of y until period t ¡ 1.
3. For t = 1, when no history is available, use the ergodic probabilities calculated in Step 1
instead of the conditional probabilities.
4. Update the prior probability Pr(zt = zijyt¡1) using Bayesian updating Equations 13 and
15.
5. Repeat Steps 2-4 for 8t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg.
6. The log likelihood function is evaluated by simply adding the logged conditional density











subject to Pii > 0, Pjj > 0 and Pii > Pji (see Assumption).
The estimates of the productivity shock are fzH;zLg = f0:0175;¡0:0427g which translate
into fexp(zH);exp(zL)g = f1 + 0:0177;1 ¡ 0:0418g. The estimated transition probabilities are
PHH = 0:8933 and PLL = 0:6815. The estimated persistent component variance is ¾z = 0:0260,
and the estimated noise component variance is ¾´ is 0:0362, the ratio of the two is ¾z
¾´ = 0:7182.
With these parameters, the estimated signal-to-noise ratio is zH¡zL
¾´ = 1:6638. The productivity
shocks and the transition probability matrix approximate a Normal AR(1) process: zt+1 =
(0:0004) + (0:5763)zt + ²t+1, where ¾² = 0:0213. This calibration implies ¾²
¾´ = 0:5888 which
constitutes another measure of information content of the signals.12
For comparison, we estimate these parameters using constant price GDP data for the US for
the same time period using the same estimation procedure. Not surprisingly, we ¯nd a lower
variance for the persistent component (¾z = 0:0086) as well as lower variance for the noise
(¾´ = 0:0060) compared to those of Turkey. What determines the informativeness of the signals
however, is the ratio of these two variances. So, we calculate signal-to-noise ratios for the US
and compare them with those of Turkey. The signal-to-noise ratios estimated for the US are
zH¡zL
¾´ = 2:7037 (vs. 1.6638 for Turkey) and ¾²
¾´ = 0:7258 (vs. 0.5888 for Turkey). This ¯nding
12This, in fact, is the conventional measure of the information content of the signals when learning takes place
about continuous as opposed to discrete variables.
16suggests that if we were to solve the model calibrated to the US economy, the signals would
be much more informative and therefore, the signal extraction problem faced by the investors
would be easier.
3.3 Quantitative Findings
Figure 4 shows the ergodic distribution of the domestic investors' asset position, ®, for a situation
in which investors have full information (panel (a)) and in which investors have incomplete
information (panel (b)) scenarios. The \full information" scenario corresponds to the case in
which the information set of both investors is II
t ´ fdt;dt¡1;:::;zt;zt¡1;:::g.13 In both cases, the
ergodic distributions are skewed to the left. The informational imperfection reduces the mean
asset holdings of domestic investors. This is because the informational imperfection increases
the uncertainty associated with future asset returns, and, hence, risk averse domestic investors
are less inclined to demand risky assets.
0.82  0.88 0.94  1     α 
(a) 
1  0.94 0.88 0.82
(b) 
α 
Figure 4: Ergodic distribution of domestic investors' asset holdings, ®, in the case of (a) full information,
and (b) incomplete information.
The ergodic distribution of beliefs, e z, is plotted in Figure 5. In this distribution, most of
the mass is concentrated at the tails, or around zL and zH. This result arises because beliefs
usually being close to correct. The extent to which the mass is concentrated at the tails depends
crucially on the signal-to-noise ratio. The more informative the signals, the less beliefs deviate
from the truth and the more the ergodic distribution is concentrated at the tails. Another
feature of this distribution is its skewness. Skewness is a result of the asymmetry of the Markov
transition matrix. The high state is more persistent than the low, an asymmetry that both sets
13One can model a full information scenario by setting ¾´ = 0. However, doing so would alter the distribution
of the dividend process. As a result, it would not be possible to distinguish changes in results that are due to
full information per se from those due to the change in the distribution of the dividend process.




Figure 5: Ergodic distribution of beliefs, e z.
of investors acknowledge as they formulate their beliefs. Knowing that there are more periods
in which the economy is in the high state than in the low state, investors' beliefs are more likely
to be close to zH than zL.
Table 3 documents the long run moments of simulated and actual data.14 Consistent with
Figure 4, average asset holdings of the domestic investors is higher in the full information scenario
than in the incomplete information scenario (86.1 percent v. 84 percent). As a result of their
greater asset holdings, domestic investors' consumption is also higher on average in the full
information scenario than in the incomplete information. In the full information case, higher
average consumption and lower consumption volatility lead to a higher level of welfare compared
to the case in which investors have only incomplete information.
Going from the full information setup to one with incomplete information, the standard
deviations of consumption and the current account increase by 2.1 percentage points, and 0.4
percent, respectively. On the other hand, the standard deviation of asset prices falls by 0.87
basis points. The decline in the standard deviation of asset prices is due to beliefs being a convex
combination of the low and high value of true productivity. (See Equation (16) and Proposition
1.)
The correlation between true productivity, z, and asset prices, q, falls from 0.9990 in the full
information setup to 0.6678 in the incomplete information setup. This is due to booms-busts
induced by the imperfection of information, which gives rise to misperceptions regarding the
true state of productivity. In the full information case, all of the cycles are driven by changes
in true productivity and noise shocks have negligible e®ects on asset prices. Although most of
14We simulate the model for 10,000 periods and calculate the moments after dropping the ¯rst 1,000 observa-
tions.






¾(z) 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884
¾(´) 3.6341 3.6341 3.6341
¾(d) 4.5694 4.5514 4.5514
¾(c)=E(c) (%) 5.4597 2.1265 4.2168
¾(q)=E(q) (%) 38.0997 0.0370 0.0283
¾(CA=d) (%) 3.1168 3.6134 3.8935
corr(d;c) 0.6984 0.3153 0.4425
corr(d;q) 0.0718 0.5611 0.8327
corr(d;CA) -0.4217 0.9019 0.5801
corr(d;®0) 0.0347 0.1655
corr(e z;e z¡1) x 0.5532
corr(z;q) 0.9990 0.6678
Table 3: Long-run business cycle moments, simulated data is logged and HP ¯ltered.
the booms and busts in the incomplete information scenario are also due to changes in true
productivity, there is a signi¯cant number of optimism-pessimism driven cycles.
The autocorrelation coe±cient of e z is 0.5532 which suggests that transitory shocks have
persistent e®ects on beliefs. This occurs because investors cannot distinguish the component of
shocks that is persistent from the component that is transitory. The belief updating structure
is the key element in the model that induces persistence: the previous period's posteriors are
current period's priors.
Another important observation from Table 3 is the decrease in the correlation between div-
idends and the current account going from full information to imperfect information (0.90 vs.
0.58). In response to a positive dividend shock, domestic investors would like to increase their
19asset position so as to smooth consumption over time and in addition, their expectations for
asset returns increase since they observe a positive signal. Foreign investors are modeled not to
have a consumption smoothing motive therefore, for them only the second e®ect (positive sig-
nal) is present and this e®ect is in fact stronger than their domestic counterparts because they
bid more aggressively for the asset when there is a positive signal due to their risk neutrality.
Overall, we ¯nd that usually the ¯rst e®ect is greater than the second, and therefore, the model
produces a procyclical current account. However, as we mentioned the procyclicality is lower





















Figure 6: Time series simulation for the case of full information.
Figures 6 and 7 show simulated asset prices, productivity, and consumption under full infor-
mation and incomplete information, respectively. In the full information case, swings in asset
prices match the swings in productivity and shocks to the transitory component of dividends
have minimal e®ects on prices. Without the information role of dividends, in response to a
negative noise shock domestic investors would like to be net sellers so as to intertemporally
smooth their consumption and thus at equilibrium asset prices fall. However, this e®ect on
prices is small and not visible in the ¯gure. In the incomplete information scenario, asset prices
°uctuate both with true productivity and with transitory shocks. Noisy signals thus can in-





















Figure 7: Time series simulation for the case of incomplete information.
as mentioned before, the volatility of consumption increases substantially when we introduce
informational imperfections.
In Figure 8, we plot the conditional forecasting functions starting from a state where investors
are optimistic (¯rst column) and where they are pessimistic (second column). In the optimistic
scenario we set the state variables to (®;e z;d) = (0:840;0:017;0:958): that is, beliefs are e z =
max(e z); dividends are set to signal that the productivity is low; d = ezL and the domestic
investors' asset position is set to its long-run mean. The pessimistic scenario is set to start
at (®;e z;d) = (0:840;¡0:042;0:958). Hence, these scenarios are identical except for the initial
beliefs.
In the ¯gures for consumption and asset prices, the vertical axes show percentage deviations
from long-run means. In the ¯gure for the current account, the vertical axis shows the ratio of the
current account to dividends in percentage terms. On impact in period one, the economy with
optimistic investors is characterized by a current account de¯cit as well as a boom in consumption
and asset prices. In period two, however, consumption falls sharply below its mean by 1.5% and
the current account turns to a surplus of roughly 2.5%. The prices also adjust downwards but
the adjustment is more gradual than those of consumption and the current account. After the
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Figure 8: Forecasting functions conditional on ® = 0:840, d = zL, e z = zH (¯rst column), and e z = zL
(second column).
22second period, all variables slowly and monotonically converge to their long-run means.
The dynamics of the model economy starting with optimistic investors are similar to that of
an emerging market in the period before a crisis. As documented in Section 1, pre-crisis periods
are generally characterized by current account de¯cits as well as consumption and asset price
booms. Our model is able to forecast a collapse in consumption and asset prices as well as
reversal of the current account after this period of optimism.
The results in Table 3 suggested that the model produces a procyclical current account
on average and in the imperfect information scenario this procyclicality is lower than in the
full information case. Previously, we explained the model dynamics that lead to this result.
The forecasting functions plotted in Figure 8 support the previous explanation and the results
of Table 3. Particulary, the economy with optimistic investors has a current account de¯cit
because, ceteris paribus, the higher the beliefs, the lower the current account.
Probability (%) Booms Busts
Prob[Prob(zt = zijIU
t ;zt = zj) > 0:5] 9.6800 4.2300
Prob[Prob(zt = zijIU
t ;zt = zj) > 0:5jzt = zj] 37.1023 5.7232
Duration (quarters)









Table 4: Analysis of optimism (pessimism) driven booms (busts).
Table 4 analyzes optimism and pessimism driven cycles in terms of their frequency, average
duration, and magnitude. In order to conduct the analysis, we use simulated data to identify
periods in which investors assign a probability greater than 0.5 to productivity being high (low)
23even though the true productivity is low (high) and call them optimism (pessimism) periods.15 In
the second and third rows of Table 4, we report the ratio of the number of optimism (pessimism)
periods to the total number of observations, and to the number of periods in which the state was
low (high), respectively. We calculate the average duration by calculating the average length
of the distinct optimism-pessimism periods. Given the inherent noiseness of signals obtained
by calibrating the model to a typical emerging economy, this table reveals how often investors
turn optimistic-pessimistic due to misleading signals, how long these periods last, and more
importantly, whether and how much optimism (pessimism) periods are associated with booms
(busts) in asset prices and consumption and current account de¯cits (surpluses).
Unconditionally, the model produces optimism driven booms with a 9.64% probability,
whereas it produces pessimism driven busts with a 4.23% probability. Also, given that the
true state is low, there is a 37.10% probability that the investors are optimistic and similarly,
conditional on the true productivity being high, the investors are pessimistic with 5.72% prob-
ability. The former is more likely to happen because investors interpret positive signals to be
more \credible" than negative signals due to the asymmetry of the Markov transition probability
matrix. The optimism in response to a misleading positive signal is greater than the pessimism
caused by a misleading negative signal with the same magnitude.
On average, the model predicts an average duration of 1.35 (1.21) quarters for the optimism
(pessimism) driven booms (busts). These cycles are relatively short lived because these cycles
hinge on the realization of a sequence of positive or negative signals.
In the same table, we also report the size of these booms-busts as percentage deviations from
the value that corresponding variables would have taken if investors had correctly estimated the
true productivity instead of being optimistic or pessimistic. The magnitude for the asset price
boom is small when we look at it as pecentage deviation because the equilibrium asset prices
have low volatility. This magnitude is closer to what we observe in the data in terms of standard
deviations. The boom periods are characterized by asset prices, consumption, and current
account that are on average 2.36, 1.31, and 0.83 standard deviations above what they would
have been if the investors were not optimistic. The over-pricing as well as over-consumption
are evident in this table. Especially, the over-pricing of the emerging market asset is signi¯cant:
during the booms on average we observe prices that are more than two standard deviations higher
15Note that by doing so, we are picking up only those periods in which optimistism and pessimism are due to
misperceptions of investors.
24that what they would have been if investors were not optimistic. Similarly, we see under-pricing
and under-consumption during the busts, although their magnitudes are smaller in absolute
value than those observed during booms due to the asymmetry of the Markov process.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We document the long run business cycle moments of the model with di®erent calibrations for
the noisiness of the signals, ¾´, and trading costs, a and µ. The third column of Table 5 shows
the results with ¾´ = 0:0265 and we compare these results with those of the baseline model
with ¾´ = 0:0362 reproduced in the second column.16 With lower ¾´, the standard deviation of
dividends, consumption and the current account fall by 85, 20, and 27 basis points, respectively.
Average consumption among domestic investors increases due to the lower volatility of dividends
and the associated decrease in uncertainty regarding future asset returns.
Lower ¾´ implies that the signals are more informative and credible. Therefore, learning is
faster compared to the baseline scenario. This leads to less persistence in beliefs. The autocorre-
lation of beliefs drops down to 0.54 from 0.55 in the baseline model. In addition, the probability
of optimism-pessimism driven cycles falls leading to a stronger correlation between asset prices
and true productivity.
The fourth column of the same table presents the results for the scenario with higher per
trade costs, a = 0:002. The standard deviation of prices, consumption, and the current account
increase by 0.05, 26, and 67 basis points, respectively. Due to higher per trade costs on the foreign
investors' side, domestic investors hold more of the asset in equilibrium, leading to higher mean
consumption but more volatile consumption.
Analysis of the scenario with no recurrent costs, µ = 0, is reported in the ¯fth column. The
results remain largely unchanged except for the slight drops in the current account volatility and
the correlation of the current account with dividends.
4 Conclusion
The boom-bust cycles of emerging economies suggest that periods of apparent prosperity in
these countries might contain the seeds of crises. This paper explores this possibility using
an open economy equilibrium asset pricing model with imperfect information in which agents
16With ¾´ = 0:0265 the signal-to-noise ratio increases to 2.26 from 1.66 in the baseline scenario.
25Table 5: Sensitivity analysis, simulated data is logged and linearly detrended.
Incomplete Information Baseline ¾´ = 0:0265 a = 0:002 µ = 0
E(d) 1.0036 1.0036 1.0036 1.0036
E(c) 0.8419 0.8472 0.8663 0.8417
E(q) 83.0617 83.0937 82.9521 83.0636
E(®) 0.8397 0.8448 0.8637 0.8398
E(CA) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
¾(z) 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884 2.5884
¾(´) 3.6341 2.6512 3.6341 3.6341
¾(d) 4.5514 3.6997 4.5514 4.5514
¾(c)=E(c) (%) 4.2168 4.0287 4.4765 4.2153
¾(q)=E(q) (%) 0.0283 0.0291 0.0288 0.0285
¾(CA) (%) 3.8935 3.7166 4.5698 3.8472
corr(d;c) 0.4425 0.4318 0.2163 0.4519
corr(d;q) 0.8327 0.8505 0.8038 0.8313
corr(d;®0) 0.1655 0.1403 0.0216 0.2064
corr(d;CA) 0.5801 0.6032 0.6591 0.5751
corr(e z;e z¡1) 0.5532 0.5407 0.5532 0.5532
corr(z;q) 0.6678 0.7282 0.6694 0.6761
do not know the true state of productivity in the economy. The main contribution of the
paper is its ability to endogeously generate (a) periods of optimism characterized by booms in
asset prices and consumption followed by sudden reversals, (b) sensitivity to negative signals
that increases with, and arises from, investor optimism attained prior to the negative signal.
These results are due to the fact that informational frictions generate a disconnect between
country fundamentals and asset prices. That is, busts (booms) in asset markets can occur even
though the fundamentals of the economy are strong (weak). Asset prices display persistence in
response to transitory shocks since investors cannot perfectly identify the underlying state of
productivity. Due to the additional uncertainty created by informational frictions, the volatility
of the emerging economy's consumption increases by 2 percentage points compared to the full
26information scenario. In addition, periods with high levels of optimism are more likely to be
associated with current account de¯cits than periods of pessimism.
Although the informational frictions introduced in this paper can produce booms and busts
in asset prices and consumption due to shifts in investor con¯dence, these booms and busts are
short lived and are of about the same size as regular business cycles. In addition, even though
the introduction of imperfect information provides an improvement in terms of matching the
volatility of consumption and the current account dynamics observed in the data, the model
cannot account for the volatility of asset prices.
The role of informational frictions in understanding emerging market regularities is an area
ready for further research. For instance, the model presented in this paper endogenously pro-
duces sensitivity to negative signals given an exogenous sequence of positive signals. We could
think of producing an endogeous sequence of positive signals by introducing strategic informa-
tion manipulation into the model, especially prevalent during the run-ups to crises. If there is
initially some sensitivity due to short-term and/or dollarized debt, a policymaker might ¯nd
it optimal to manipulate or screen the signals to send positive signals. However, this would
come at a cost because, by taking out the negative signals and sending only positive ones, the
sensitivity of the economy to a sudden downward adjustment would increase. This would cre-
ate a feedback mechanism in which the policymaker, concerned about the country's ability to
continue borrowing in international markets, has a self-perpetuating incentive to hide negative
information about the economy from the public.
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Appendix
Throughout this section, we assume that i;j 2 fL;Hg and i 6= j.
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote the prior Pr(zt = zijIu
t¡1) = pt(i) and the Normal density function f(dtjzt = zi) =
f(i) for i 2 fL;Hg.
Priors:
Evolution of pt(i) is characterized by:
pt(i) =
pt¡1(i)f(i)Pii + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j)Pji
pt¡1(i)f(i) + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j)
:
² pt(i) = 1 , pt¡1(i)f(i)Pii + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j)Pji = pt¡1(i)f(i) + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j) and
pt¡1(i)f(i) + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j) 6= 0. Given P >> 0 (see Assumption), the ¯rst condition is
satis¯ed i®
pt¡1(i) = 0 and f(j) = 0 or
pt¡1(i) = 1 and f(i) = 0, both of which violate the second condition.
² pt(i) = 0 , f(j)Pji +pt¡1(i)[f(i)Pii ¡f(j)Pji] = 0 and pt¡1(i)f(i)+[1¡pt¡1(i)]f(j) 6= 0.
The ¯rst condition is satis¯ed i®
31f(j) = 0 and f(i)Pii = f(j)Pji. These two hold i® f(j) = 0 and f(i) = 0, in which
case the second condition above does not hold.
f(j) = 0 and pt¡1 = 0. In this case, second condition is again violated.









pt¡1(i)f(i) + [1 ¡ pt¡1(i)]f(j)
:
Clearly, all terms on the right hand side of the equation are positive: p > 0 (the proof above)
and f > 0 (Normal distribution).
Proof of Proposition 2
First Argument: We need to show that
@Á(e zt;:)
@e zt > 0 for 8 e zt. Denote the posterior probabilities
Pr(zt = zijIU
t ) = °t and f(dt+1jzt = zi) = f(i). We start with expressing °t+1 as a function of
°t:
°t+1 =
[°tPii + (1 ¡ °t)Pji]f(i)



























zi ¡ zj: (A-3)





f[°tPii + (1 ¡ °t)Pji]f(i) + [1 ¡ °tPii ¡ (1 ¡ °t)Pji]f(j)g2: (A-4)
Plug in Equations (A-3) and (A-4) into Equation (A-2). To complete the proof, we need to
establish f(zi);f(zj) > 0 and Pii > Pji. f(zi);f(zj) > 0 for 8zi;zj since the Normal distribution
is unbounded. Pii > Pji follows from Assumption 2.3.
32Second Argument: We need to show that
@Á(:;dt+1)












Denote A = Pij + °(Pii ¡ Pji). Then we can rewrite Equation (A-1):
°t+1 =
Af(i)













2¾2 [(dt+1¡zi)2¡(dt+1¡zj)2] = e
(2dt+1¡zj¡zi)(zj¡zi)
2¾2 :

























(1 + [(1 ¡ A)=A][f(j)=f(i)])
2: (A-9)






¾[1 + (1 ¡ A)=A(f(j)=f(i))]
¸2
e
(2dt+1¡zj¡zi)(zj¡zi)
2¾2 > 0:
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